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CCP Response to Ofcom’s invitation to comment on the public interest 
test in the Sky/21st Century Fox transaction 
 
 
The authors welcome the opportunity to respond to Ofcom’s invitation to comment on 
the application of the public interest test to the proposed Sky/21st Century Fox 
transaction. There already exists an abundance of evidence relating to Sky’s news 
production and distribution, as well as the prominence of its news content and that of 
the other news companies run by its senior management, which raise media plurality 
concerns in relation to this deal.1 We trust that Ofcom will be diligent and creative in 
assessing the risks to media plurality in terms of citizens’ access to news and 
information, going well beyond consumption data and perhaps revising its “share of 
references” metric. However, the role of media in our society is not solely the provision 
of news and the representation of various groups and viewpoints within that news. It is 
also to provide a variety of content through which our norms, values, and identities are 
negotiated. Therefore our contribution will focus on two other issues that we believe 
are crucial to the media plurality public interest test and have broader implications: 
(1) Sky’s position as an internet service provider (ISP), and (2) the relationship between 
this public interest test and the concurrent “fit and proper” test. The response affords 
separate consideration to (3) the scope of the ‘commitment to broadcasting standards’ 
public interest ground. 
 
 
1. Media plurality implications of Sky’s position as an ISP 
 
1.1 As Ofcom’s own data shows, as of 2016 Sky held 23% of the UK’s home fixed 
broadband market.2 Its takeover of the broadband provision arms of O2 and BE in 
2013 allowed it to grow significantly in this area, supplying broadband as a 
standalone product or bundling services with subscription television and other 
services. Last year, Sky also launched Sky Mobile, a mobile service focusing 
primarily on data plans offering high quality streaming and download through 4G 
networks. The company is therefore growing rapidly as an Internet service 
provider (ISP) in fixed and mobile broadband. 
 
1.2 Traffic management by ISPs is allowed under EU rules if it is “reasonable”. 
According to the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications 
(BEREC), there should be no blocking, slowing or degradation of services except 
when absolutely necessary and for a short time, but these are still not entirely 
banned. EU rules also allow ISPs to enter into commercial agreements to give 
                                                          
1 See e.g., Steven Barnett et al, ‘Media plurality, the Fox-Sky bid, and the case for referral to Ofcom’ 
(2017) Media Policy Brief 18 <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/files/2013/09/LSE-MPP-
Policy-Brief-18-Media-Plurality.pdf> accessed 5 March 2017; Justin Schlosberg, ‘Consolidating 
Control: The Fox/Sky merger and news plurality in the UK’ (Media Reform, February 2017) 
<www.mediareform.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/plurality-review-FINAL-4.pdf> accessed 4 
March 2017. 
2 Ofcom, ‘Fast Facts’, <www.ofcom.org.uk/about-ofcom/latest/media/facts> accessed 3 March 
2017. 
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certain services optimised delivery on their networks or even zero-rating deals. 
This allows the ISP to give preferential treatment to certain content providers and 
applications, which could have serious consequences for media plurality, 
especially when the ISP is also a major content provider and rights holder. 
 
1.3 The challenge that “reasonable” traffic management and zero-rating agreements 
pose to media plurality and citizens’ access to information is already being felt. 
In last year’s European Commission consultation on media pluralism and 
democracy, the Swedish public broadcaster’s response cited the zero-rating 
agreements that ISP Telia had with certain platforms as having a detrimental 
effect on its access to audience and citizens’ ability to view its content.3 It felt 
forced to either enter into an agreement to pay for similar optimisation, or risk 
losing audience as its content was effectively delivered at a higher price to 
consumers. More than 20 other Swedish content producers, mainly broadcasters 
and publishers, were campaigning for stricter net neutrality rules because of this 
problem. Content producers from other countries also responding to the 
consultation expressed similar concerns. 
 
1.4 As a massive US-based rights holder and content producer, 21st Century Fox has 
interests that could have consequences for a variety of online services and 
applications. It will hold particular positions on some of the grey areas of copyright 
enforcement that can have implications for freedom of expression and access to 
diverse media. It may be able to use its position in negotiations over acquiring 
content rights with services that depend on Sky’s carriage to almost a quarter of 
UK households, which could affect the diversity of content that British citizens 
can access and/or the ability of British content producers to reach audiences. The 
power that a company of this size might have over the terms and arrangements 
between content and application providers and ISPs could stifle innovation in UK 
online media services. Such consequences are not certain, but are possibilities, 
and there may be others that also deserve careful consideration.  
 
1.5 Ofcom has extensive expertise on the exceptions to net neutrality and the 
potential of allowable traffic management. The current limitations on traffic 
management and preferential carriage agreements within the EU may not apply 
to the UK after 2019 and it is impossible to predict what ISPs in the UK may be 
allowed to do in the future. It is vital that Ofcom’s expertise in this area could be 
brought into the public interest test process. Thorough consideration must be 
given to the implications of Sky’s role as an ISP, both given the current conditions 
and given the possibility of even more allowances for ISPs to “manage” citizens’ 
access to content and services in the future. 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 The full response can be found on the official consultation page; European Commission, Public 
Consultation – 2016 Annual Colloquium on Fundamental Rights on ‘Media Pluralism and Democracy’ 
(2016) <http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/item-detail.cfm?item_id=31690> accessed 3 March 
2017. 
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2. Media plurality implications of the outcome of a “fit and proper” test  
 
2.1 The authors recognise the ongoing nature of Ofcom’s duty to ensure that persons 
in possession of a TV broadcast licence are “fit and proper” for the purposes of 
the Broadcasting Act 1990. Equally, we understand the legal basis that requires 
Ofcom’s assessment of the referred public interest grounds to be undertaken 
separate to any “fit and proper” test. Ofcom’s announcement that it will 
undertake a preliminary “fit and proper” investigation in parallel to the public 
interest assessment is to be praised,4 but it is important to note that an adverse 
finding in any “fit and proper” test undertaken post-merger has the potential to 
impact media plurality itself. 
 
2.2 The problem here lies in the hypothetical scenario where: (i) Ofcom concludes 
that the merger is unlikely to affect media plurality or ‘commitment to 
broadcasting standards’, but (ii) Ofcom publishes a provisional view that the 
management of the merged entity would be likely to fail the “fit and proper” test. 
Under the current provisions of the Enterprise Act 2002, the Secretary of State 
will base her decision – be it after Phase I or Phase II – on the advice she receives 
with regard to competition and the public interest grounds that have been 
referred (in principle, her decision should not be influenced by the outcome of 
the “fit and proper” test). Assuming the Secretary of State clears the merger,5 
and the transaction is finalised, media plurality concerns may nevertheless arise 
if Ofcom withdraws Sky’s TV broadcast licences on “fit and proper” grounds – given 
that, in theory, it could prompt Sky’s exit from the market. Although this outcome 
may seem far-fetched in practice,6 it highlights the risk that comes with not 
considering the media plurality and “fit and proper” assessments holistically. 
Moreover, given the significant concerns raised by Ofcom in relation to James 
Murdoch when BSkyB was subjected to the “fit and proper” test in 2012,7 it would 
not be too surprising if these were found to be even more problematic with the 
powerful role he would have should 21st Century Fox, of which he is CEO, take 
full control of Sky.  
 
2.3 Ofcom’s provisional view on the “fit and proper” status of the merged entity will 
provide a useful counterfactual of how the entity is likely to be treated with 
respect to its existing licences. If the provisional view is that the change in 
management is likely to result in Sky losing its licences, it may be appropriate for 
Ofcom to advise the Secretary of State of this possible eventuality and to include 
an additional counterfactual account of the effect that this would have in its 
assessment of the media plurality implications of the deal. 
 
                                                          
4 And, indeed, has been praised by the Secretary of State; HC Deb 16 March 2017, vol 623, col 557. 
5 Having found no basis to block the merger or seek undertakings on competition or public 
interest grounds. 
6 It is conceded that the merged entity would, in all likelihood, make changes to the membership of 
its decision-making board in an attempt to avoid having its licences withdrawn. 
7 Ofcom, Decision under section 3(3) of the Broadcasting Act 1990 and section 3(3) of the 
Broadcasting Act 1996: Licences held by British Sky Broadcasting Limited (2012) 
<www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0022/32485/bskyb-final.pdf> accessed 4 March 2017. 
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3. The scope of the ‘commitment to broadcasting standards’ ground  
 
3.1 Regarding the second public interest ground referred by the Secretary of State – 
the ‘commitment to broadcasting standards’ ground specified in s.58(2C)(c) of the 
Enterprise Act 2002 – some confusion has been voiced over the scope for 
‘corporate governance’ issues to be considered under this ground; both as part of 
the Secretary of State’s decision-making and in Ofcom’s advisory report. Those 
who suggest that ‘corporate governance’ may not fall within the scope of the 
existing law and, as such, might require its own public interest ground include: 
Lord Puttman (who tabled an amendment to the Digital Economy Bill on this very 
basis),8 Ed Miliband MP,9 Tom Watson MP10 and George Peretz QC (in his advice 
presented to Avaaz).11 On the other hand, those who suggest that s.58(2C)(c) is 
sufficiently broad in scope to encompass consideration of ‘corporate governance 
issues’ include: Baroness Buscombe,12 and the Secretary of State herself.13 Indeed, 
the Secretary of State indicated that she would ‘expect’ Ofcom to look at 
corporate governance issues, also noting that the regulator ‘is open to look at 
whatever evidence it feels is appropriate to enable it to make its decision’.14 
 
3.2 The issue at hand is whether Ofcom – having been referred the s.58(2C)(c) ground 
by the Secretary of State – is required to assess ‘corporate governance’ issues as 
part of its advice. If the Secretary of State had concluded that ‘corporate 
governance’ considerations fell outside the scope of s.58(2C)(c), but warranted 
consideration in the Phase I assessment, she had an obligation to specify this as a 
new public interest ground before issuing an intervention notice,15 or ‘as soon as 
is practicable’ after issuing an intervention notice.16 Since the Secretary of State 
decided against proposing a new public interest ground and has been clear in 
expressing her belief that ‘corporate governance’ considerations fall within 
s.58(2C)(c), it seems evident that Ofcom would be acting within its statutory ambit 
by addressing ‘corporate governance’ issues within its advisory report.  
 
3.3 The question of whether ‘corporate governance’ considerations fall within the 
scope of s.58(2C)(c) is a question for the courts to determine, in the event that 
the ruling of the Secretary of State is subjected to judicial review. The wording 
of the relevant statutory provisions (s.58(2C)(c) Enterprise Act 2002 and s.319 of 
                                                          
8 HL Deb 8 February 2017, vol 778, cols 1811-1814. 
9 HC Deb 6 March 2017, vol 622, col 586. 
10 HC Deb 16 March 2017, vol 623, col 558. 
11 George Peretz QC, ‘Re: Anticipated acquisition by Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc (“21CF”) of the 
entire issued and to be issued share capital of Sky plc (“Sky”): Proposed European intervention notice’ 
(Advisory document, 6 March 2017) <https://inforrm.files.wordpress.com/2017/02/avaaz-sky-
advice-6-3-17-1.pdf> accessed 28 March 2017. 
12 HL Deb 8 February 2017, vol 778, col 1819. 
13 HC Deb 6 March 2017, vol 622, col 581-582. The Minister cited previous ‘corporate governance 
failures’ by News Corp as a possible reason for referring the merger for a s.58(2C(c) assessment. 
14 HC Deb 16 March 2017, vol 623, col 559. 
15 The requirement for the Minister to intervene on specific public interest grounds is conferred by 
s.42(2) of the 2002 Act, with s.58(3) affording the Minister a residual power to propose new public 
interest grounds, which must be ‘finalised’ by Parliamentary approval (s.42(8)(b)). 
16 Enterprise Act 2002, s.42(7). 
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the Communications Act 2003) is sufficiently broad to at least present the 
reasonable possibility that ‘corporate governance’ may be considered; but there 
is little to point to this being Parliament’s intended meaning during Hansard 
debate of the Communications Bill. Parliament’s intended meaning may be of 
great importance here given that, in the event of judicial review where the 
interpretation of s.58(2C)(c) is a live issue, the court may adopt the Pepper v Hart 
approach to determine whether ambiguities in s.58(2C)(c) can be explained by 
reference to Ministerial statements made in Parliament during debates on the 
Communications Bill.17 In any event, judicial review would likely see greater 
scrutiny directed at the Secretary of State’s decision to draw emphasis to 
‘corporate governance’ without proposing a new public interest ground, than of 
any evidence on ‘corporate governance’ issues that Ofcom submits as a result of 
this. 
 
3.4 The proposed merger is very likely to amount to having an EU dimension, as is 
evident from 21st Century Fox’s decision to formally notify the deal to the 
European Commission.18 Assuming this is the case – and the Commission concludes 
that the merger does not raise competition concerns19 – the UK Government may 
seek jurisdiction over the assessment process on ‘legitimate national interest’ 
grounds under Article 21(4) of the EU Merger Regulation. If, after a Phase II 
assessment, the Secretary of State concludes that the merger raises media 
plurality concerns – under s.58(2C)(a) of the 2002 Act – the UK Government may 
proceed to take steps to remedy these concerns, given that media plurality is a 
named legitimate interest under Article 21(4). However, ‘commitment to 
broadcasting standards’ – under s.58(2C)(c) – is not mentioned under Article 21(4) 
and, as such, will require the UK Government to seek approval from the European 
Commission before it can take steps to protect this interest.20 As the ‘commitment 
to broadcasting standards’ ground is broadly compatible with EU law objectives, 
it is likely that the Commission will afford it ‘legitimate’ status; provided the UK 
measures are deemed ‘appropriate, proportional and non-discriminatory’.21 This 
highlights the importance of the advice and evidence that Ofcom provides on the 
‘commitment to broadcasting standards’ ground, as it may be relied upon in the 
design of potential remedies. 
 
                                                          
17 Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart [1992] UKHL 3, [1993] AC 593. 
18 Fox/Sky (Case M.8354) Prior notification of a concentration to the Commission [2017] OJ C73/24. 
19 In accordance with Article 2(3) of Council Regulation (EC) 139/2004 on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings (EU Merger Regulation) [2004] OJ L24/1. 
20 ibid, art 21(4) para 3. 
21 Lyonnaise des Eaux/Northumbrian Water (Case IV/M.567) [1996] OJ C11/3, para 8.   
